Uzbekistan -economic star?
Uzbekistan is very much an economic success story in post-Soviet space. Its transformational recession was very mild as compared to other countries of former Soviet Union, its GDP more than doubled in 1989-2012 -better result than even in Central European countries ( fig. 1 ), its life expectancy (now 68 years) did not increase much, but did not fall like in other former Soviet republics in the 1990s, its population increased from 20 mln. in 1989 to 30 mln. in 2013, and its murder rate is low (3 per 100, 000 of inhabitants, lower than in the US). In 2009, during economic recession, only Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan showed higher growth rates than Uzbekistan, whereas in most other post communist countries there was a reduction of output.
Uzbekistan's performance is not as spectacular as Chinese, but is truly exceptional for the post-Soviet space. Partly it is due to good external environment (Uzbekistan is the exporter of commodities -cotton, gold and gas, whose world prices increased in recent 2 decades), but more important reasons are associated with good macroeconomic and industrial policies. Uzbekistan became the only country in post Soviet space that managed to increase the share of industry in GDP, the share of machinery and equipment in total industrial output and in exports. Another indicator of income distribution at the very top is the number of billionaires.
The recent count (Forbes, 2013) After the collapse of the USSR real incomes in non-resource republics fell dramatically due to the change in relative prices -oil, gas and other resources became several times more expensive relative to ready made goods ( Hence, the sharp reduction of real incomes in the early 1990s was larger than the reduction of output and was due mostly to poor external environment, to circumstances, not to policies and choice. However, the dynamics of real output, i.e. of physical volume of output ( fig. 1 ) that is dependent not only on circumstances, but also on policies, was better than in all countries of Eastern Europe and former USSR except for
Turkmenistan.
Success has many fathers…
In 2002 Stephen Kotkin used the term "Trashkanistan" (Kotkin, 2002 , cited in Spechler, 2008 ) to describe Central Asia: "a dreadful checkerboard of parasitic states and statelets, government-led extortion rackets and gangs in power, mass refugee camps and shadow economies. Welcome to Trashcanistan". In fact, Stephen Kotkin applied this characterization to all the states of the former Soviet Union with the exception of Estonia, which he called "the great bright spot (approaching the level of Slovenia, the star in East-Central Europe)". However, other experts were drawing attention to the economic success of Uzbekistan, calling it a candidate for becoming a Central Asian tiger (Spechler, 2000) .
Very early in transition continuous good performance of Uzbekistan became a controversial issue. According to the conventional wisdom, non-liberalized postcommunist economies with authoritarian regimes that proceeded with very gradual market-oriented reforms were not supposed to exhibit good economic performance. In fact, in 1998, in a paper entitled "The Uzbek Growth Puzzle" Jeronim Zettelmeyer (1998) wondered why authoritarian and non-reformist Uzbekistan was doing better than other former Soviet Union (FSU) countries. He concluded that "Uzbekistan could surely have done better by creating an environment that was friendlier to the private sector entry and private production and marketing incentives, including in particular the cotton sector." He suggested that Uzbekistan could have been "unusually effective at preventing the collapse of (relatively small) industrial sector by combining rigid state control with subsidies that were in large part financed by cotton exports, and by ensuring an uninterrupted supply of energy" (Zettelmeyer, 1998, p. 32) .
The alternative view is that Uzbekistan was able to avoid the collapse of the institutional capacity of the state that occurred in many post Soviet states. Martin
Spechler points out that "in the area of human development, the Soviet overall record <in Central Asia> was impressive, at least compared with Muslim and Turkic countries to the immediate south" (Spechler, 2008, p. 28) , that Uzbekistan is the most successful state builder among poor CIS countries (Spechler, 2008, p. 55) , that there is an evidence of "institutional effectiveness" with regards to state investment and support of the industrial sector with direct subsidies and credits" (Spechler, 2008, p.66) .
Macroeconomic policy
In 2008 (Dollar, 1992; Easterly, 1999; Rodrik, 2008; Bhala, 2012 ) . Former communist countries of Eastern Europe and USSR did not carry out such a policy, on the contrary, their exchange rates was and is often overvalued, especially in countries that export resources (they suffer from the Dutch disease).
Since 2000 Uzbekistan is probably the only country in post Soviet space that carries out predictable and gradual nominal devaluation of the currency which is a bit larger than needed to counter the differences in inflation rates between Uzbekistan and its major trading partners, so that real effective exchange rate depreciates slowly. The real exchange rate of the som versus the US dollar has appreciated a bit, though not as much as currencies of other countries ( fig.4) . However, the real effective exchange rate of som 0 1 9 9 9 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 0 1 9 8 9 
Industrial policy and economic diversification
Industrial structure matters for economic development. In theoretical models it is often assumed that there are externalities from industrialization and industrial export (Murphy, Shleifer, Vishny, 1989; . And there is growing evidence that more industrialized countries and countries with more technologically sophisticated industrial export are growing faster than others (Hausmann, Hwang, Rodrik, 2006; Rodrik, 2006) . But not all countries are able to climb the technological ladder and to diversify and upgrade the structure of their economies and exports. In most transition economies there occurred a primitivization of the industrial structure as secondary manufacturing and high tech industries proved to be uncompetitive after deregulation of prices and opening up of the economy and curtailed their output.
The increase in the share of service sector, especially trade and finance, at the expense of industry (deindustrialization) occurred in all post communist economies (previously in the centrally planned economies the service sector, in particular trade and finance, were underdeveloped), but it seems like in many of these economies deindustrialization went too far. In Tajikistan, for instance, the share of services in GDP nearly doubled -increased from about 30% in the beginning of the 1990s to 57% in 2010 (WDI), whereas the share of manufacturing in GDP fell from 25% in 1990 to 10% in 2010. In Russia the share of fuel, minerals, metals and diamonds in total export grew from 52% in 1990 (USSR) to 67% in 1995 and to 81% in 2012, whereas the share of machinery and equipment fell from 18% in 1990 (USSR) to 10% in 1995 and to 4.5% in 2012.
The structure of exports in most countries of North and Central Asia also became more primitive in recent two decades -the share of manufactured goods in total exports either declined or did not show any clear tendency towards increase ( fig. 6 ). Partly it was caused by the increase in resource prices and resource boom -expansion of fuel production and exports in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkmenistan. The only exception to the rule and the only example of relatively successful diversification may be Uzbekistan. It managed to encourage and carry out three important structural shifts in its economy: (1) decrease in cotton production and export and increase in food production, achieving self-sufficiency in food, (2) achieving self sufficiency in energy and becoming a net fuel exporter; (3) increasing the share of industry in GDP and the share of machinery and equipment in industrial output and export.
Diversification in agriculture was carried out mostly via state orders (less for cotton, more for cereals), so production of cotton decreased by 50% (as compared to the late 1980s) and output of cereals and vegetables increased several times ( fig. 7) . Increase in gas output was due mostly via state investments (gas and oil are produced by state holding company "Uzbekneftegaz"). And diversification in industry and expansion of manufacturing exports was the result of government / central bank policy of low exchange rate. Like China, Uzbekistan maintained a low (undervalued) exchange rate due to rapid accumulation of foreign exchange reserves. In addition, there were nonnegligible tax measures to stimulate exports of processed goods (50% lower tax rate for manufacturing companies that export 30% and more of their output). Uzbekistan's exports increased dramatically -from $2 billion in 1992 to $15 billion in 2011, or from $100 per capita to $500 ( fig. 9 ). The share of former USSR countries in exports fell from over 60% in 1992 to less than 40% in 2012 ( fig. 10) . 9%. In imports the share of food fell from 43 to 10%, whereas the share of machinery and equipment increased from 10 to 46% ( fig.11) . 
